Affective blocs : Understanding affective polarization in multiparty systems by Kekkonen, Arto & Ylä-Anttila, Tuomas
Electoral Studies 72 (2021) 102367
Available online 28 June 2021
0261-3794/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Affective blocs: Understanding affective polarization in multiparty systems 
Arto Kekkonen *, Tuomas Ylä-Anttila 
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Latent profile analysis 
A B S T R A C T   
Research has suggested that affective polarization (AP)—the extent to which partisans view each other as a 
disliked out-group—has increased, especially in two-party political systems such as in the US. The understanding 
of AP in multiparty systems remains limited. We study AP in Finland, characterized by a strong multiparty system 
and a low level of ideological polarization, between 2007 and 2019. We find that AP has increased, driven mainly 
by voters evaluating their least favorite party more negatively. We also propose an approach that goes beyond 
earlier literature, which has mostly used a single aggregate metric to measure AP. Using latent profile analysis, 
we find that voters are grouped into blocs that view some parties positively and others negatively. This suggests 
that the complex dynamics of AP in multiparty democracies involve relationships between not just individual 
parties but between what we call affective blocs that span across party lines.   
1. Introduction 
Political polarization has most commonly been thought of in terms of 
ideology. Although the exact definitions vary, ideological polarization is 
often indicated by a divergence in opinions, attitudes, or placement on 
an ideological axis (such as left-wing versus right-wing) among members 
in a population (e.g., Dalton 2008; DiMaggio et al., 1996; Pew Research 
Center 2014). The literature on polarization consists of curiously con-
flicting results and claims. Some sources, in the US in particular, have 
argued that political polarization has become a significant concern 
(Abramowitz & Saunders 2005, 2008; Pew Research Center 2014), 
while yet others claim that mass polarization is largely a myth (Fiorina 
et al., 2008). 
An alternative definition of political polarization has focused on 
animosity between members and supporters of different political 
groups, and has been termed affective polarization (AP). Grounded in the 
social identity theory (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1979), AP refers to 
“the extent to which partisans view each other as a disliked out-group” 
(Iyengar et al., 2012, p. 406). In the US, AP between Democratic and 
Republican partisans has been shown to be considerable and to have 
increased dramatically during the past half-century (Iyengar et al., 
2012); this finding has generated considerable interest and spawned 
numerous follow-up papers, for example, those comparing partisan an-
imosity to racial discrimination (Iyengar and Westwood 2015), whether 
AP is caused by ideological cleavages (Webster and Abramowitz 2017), 
and on potential ways of decreasing AP (Levendusky 2018). Most 
research on AP has focused on the US two-party system. Recently, 
though, a number of papers (e.g., Reiljan 2020; Gidron et al., 2019; 
Wagner 2020) have examined the phenomenon in European multiparty 
contexts, but the understanding of AP in these contexts remains rela-
tively limited. 
In the current paper, we contribute to the understanding of AP, 
particularly in multiparty contexts, by examining the case of Finland. 
Finland is an interesting case in this respect, first, because of its strong 
multiparty system: the number of parliamentary parties in recent de-
cades has varied between 8 and 11, and government coalitions have 
been extremely wide. Thus, the dynamics of AP in Finland are likely to 
be markedly different from those observed in the US two party system 
where the concept was originally coined. Second, Finland is a country of 
relatively low ideological polarization, and until 2015 it appears to have 
been a country of low affective polarization, too (Reiljan 2020). Thus, to 
the extent that ideological and affective polarization are linked to one 
another, Finland is a least likely case for affective polarization to occur. 
Were we to find evidence of strong and increasing AP in Finland, this 
would constitute additional evidence to the argument put forth by some 
scholars that ideological and affective polarization can occur relatively 
independently of one another (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012). 
Using data from the Finnish National Election Survey (2007–2019), 
we examine whether AP has increased in Finland, what factors 
contribute to its possible increase, and what ideological dimensions 
(economic, sociocultural) are linked to AP. We look at whether strong 
partisan affect is more clearly associated with some groups than others, 
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what kind of affect is displayed by different groups toward Finland’s 
parliamentary parties, and how these have evolved over time. Finally, 
we employ latent profile analysis to look at whether party likeability 
ratings can be used to divide voters into affective blocs that cut across 
party lines. This approach makes a unique contribution to the literature 
on AP. We suggest that because most operationalizations of AP are based 
on assuming an affiliation with a single party, they are prone to mis-
characterizing situations with more fluid group boundaries, such as the 
current context of Finland. Finally, we reflect on how our findings help 
in understanding AP, particularly in multiparty systems. 
2. Theoretical approach, hypotheses and research questions 
The concept of AP is rooted in viewing partisanship through the lens 
of the social identity theory (Greene 1999; Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and 
Turner 1979) and refers to ‘the extent to which partisans view each other 
as a disliked out-group’ (Iyengar et al., 2012). In this view, polarization 
consists of two things: people demonstrating animosity toward those 
whom they do not identify with politically and (perhaps to a lesser de-
gree) favoritism toward their political in-group. In the literature on AP, 
the in-group has commonly been equated with the political party (or 
in-party) that a person supports, and the out-group has been associated 
with those parties (out-parties) that they do not support. Iyengar et al. 
(2012) operationalize their definition of AP as the difference in ratings 
given by Americans to the party that they support (Republicans or 
Democrats) and the ‘other’ party. They show that AP increased signifi-
cantly in the US between over the past 50 years; although in-party 
thermometer ratings remained largely stable, negative affect toward 
the out-party increased among Republicans and Democrats alike. They 
also present evidence that this negative affect is connected to nonpo-
litical attitudes, such as views of the prospect of one’s child marrying 
someone who supports the other party and an evaluation of personality 
traits of out-group members. Since then, a number of studies have pro-
vided further evidence of the existence of AP and its importance, have 
debated the issue, or have explored related phenomena (e.g., Reiljan 
2020; Gidron et al., 2019; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Iyengar and 
Krupenkin 2018; Westwood et al., 2018; Webster and Abramowitz 2017; 
Luttig 2018; Levendusky 2018; Huddy et al., 2015; Huddy et al., 2018; 
Satherley et al., 2020; Skytte 2020; Druckman and Levendusky 2019; 
Boxell et al., 2020). The same phenomenon has also been studied by 
others using somewhat different terminology (Lupu 2015; Lauka et al., 
2018). 
It is relevant to note that AP might occur independently from ideo-
logical polarization, and the relationship between the two is not yet 
clear. Iyengar et al. (2012) make the case that AP is not driven by 
ideological polarization, while Webster and Abramowitz (2017) argue 
that AP, in the US at least, is ultimately rooted in ideological differences. 
Partisan sorting, or the alignment of partisan identities into consistent 
ideological positions, has been suggested as a cause of both increasing 
ideological polarization between parties (Abramowitz and Saunders 
1998) and of AP (Mason 2015 2016; Mason and Wronski 2018). How-
ever, the evidence for these claims is mixed. The causal chain might also 
operate in a different way; AP may drive sorting and, therefore, ideo-
logical polarization (Lelkes 2018). In a cross-country comparison, Reil-
jan (2020) finds that European countries display all combinations of 
high and low ideological and affective polarization, noting that the link 
between the two is weak. It also appears entirely possible for people to 
denigrate their political out-groups using ideological terms without 
actually holding a meaningful, consistent set of political positions, 
further muddying the relationship between ideological and AP (Mason 
2018). In any case, it makes sense to differentiate between the two for 
theoretical purposes as well as the sake of practical implications. It is 
possible for citizens to disagree on policy while still retaining mutual 
respect and warm affect, as well as having similar opinions but holding 
each other in disregard. 
For the most part, research on AP has been done in the US, which has 
the convenience of being a two-party system with two roughly equal- 
sized, ideologically diverging parties. This makes conceptualizing and 
measuring AP fairly simple compared with political systems with mul-
tiple parties and less clear-cut divisions. Some recent studies have 
looked into AP in other kinds of political systems, but the understanding 
of the phenomenon outside the US is still relatively limited. The avail-
able studies suggest that AP is a universal phenomenon. Evidence has 
been found for its existence and increase over time in Sweden (Huddy 
et al., 2018), the UK (Huddy et al., 2018; Westwood et al., 2018), and 
Belgium and Spain (Westwood et al., 2018). Partisanship appears to be a 
stronger predictor of out-group prejudice than many other social 
cleavages, such as ethnic and religious attributes (Westwood et al., 
2018). Comparative studies that have included Finland have suggested 
that affective polarization increased slightly but remained low between 
2007 and 2015 (Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020). Nevertheless, there is a 
growing perception that Finnish politics is becoming more polarized, 
and that the importance of political social identities is rising (Isotalo 
et al., 2020). Based on this literature, our first hypothesis is: 
H1. Affective polarization in Finland has increased from 2015 to 2019 
Research has also shown that increasing AP seems to be driven more 
by increasing out-party animosity than an increase in-party favoritism 
(Iyengar et al., 2012). Voters see their least favorite party in more and 
more negative light, rather than turning more positive in their view of 
their own party of choice. Although it is possible that these dynamics 
play out slightly differently in a multi-party system than a two-party 
one, these findings lead us to hypothesize: 
H2. To the extent that AP has increased, this is driven more strongly by 
increasing out-party hostility than by increasing in-party favoritism 
Recently, Reiljan (2020) has introduced a measure of affective po-
larization, the Affective Polarization Index (API), using it to compare 
levels of affective polarization across European countries and the US by 
using Comparative Study of Election Systems (CSES) data. This 
approach, which we will adopt and extend, is based on assigning a single 
in-party to a survey respondent and comparing their in-party rating and 
average out-party rating. His analysis indicates that AP is present in 
European party systems and, in many cases, is higher than across the 
Atlantic, with Southern and Eastern European countries relatively more 
polarized compared with countries in Northwestern Europe. 
The API measure is highly useful, but it suffers from one major 
deficiency because of a limitation in the CSES data: the respondents can 
usually name only one party that they feel close to, and therefore, their 
in-group has to be defined as consisting of a single political party. In 
reality, in a multiparty system, people probably feel more kinship with 
some parties and display animosity toward several others. Therefore, it 
is possible that average out-party affect would remain constant while the 
difference between the highest and lowest out-party ratings grows or 
that negative affect increases toward a single party only. API does take 
this into account to some degree by weighting the importance of parties 
in determining the AP value by their vote share in the most recent 
elections. Some measures aim to do away with assigning party affiliation 
to respondents or by using like ratings to classify partisans (e.g. Wagner 
2020). A disadvantage with inferring partisan leaning from like ratings 
is that it conflates party attitudes, which the ratings measure, with party 
belonging. Arguably, these are separates concepts (Greene 2002), the 
latter of which more closely relates to the concept of in-party as it has 
been used in literature on affective polarization. As of now, there is no 
consensus on how to party affiliation in multiparty contexts. 
We contribute to the literature by proposing an approach that can 
reveal some of the details in the development of AP that remain invisible 
for measures like the API, which focuses on average out-party affect. 
Using latent profile analysis, we examine whether voters are clustered 
into a number of groups smaller than the total number of parties, within 
which there are signs of favoritism toward one and of animosity toward 
another set of parties. We call these groups affective blocs. This approach 
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allows us to examine the development of AP at a level larger than that of 
one party, which we argue is important for understanding how the 
phenomenon manifests itself in multiparty contexts. Unlike previous 
approaches (e.g. Huddy et al., 2018; Knudsen 2020), ours is not based on 
a priori grouping parties based on blocs or government coalitions or 
selecting a subset of parties for analysis (Boxell et al., 2020). Thus, our 
analysis is guided by the following open research question: 
RQ1: What kinds of affective blocs can be found by analysing atti-
tudes towards parties? 
As noted above, findings concerning the relationship between ideo-
logical and affective polarization are mixed. This may be because 
different dimensions of the ideological spectrum (e.g. economic left- 
right, sociocultural) may have different effects on AP. Our analysis of 
affective blocs contributes to knowledge on the relationship between 
affective and ideological polarization by examining which particular 
dimensions of ideology could be a contributing factor to AP. Thus, we 
examine the extent to which affective blocs overlap with different 
ideological cleavages identified in the existing literature. Westinen and 
Kestilä-Kekkonen (2015) found the electorate in our case country, 
Finland, to be divided into two blocs on the sociocultural dimension, the 
conservative bloc and the red-green liberal bloc. On the traditional 
socio-economic dimension, they found three blocs: left-wing, blue collar 
and right-wing blocs. Due to the mixed results in earlier literature and 
the exploratory nature of this analysis we do not have strong expecta-
tions on which of these ideological dimensions is more strongly aligned 
with affective polarization. Thus, the second open research question 
guiding our analysis is: 
RQ2: To what extent do the affective blocs overlap with the ideo-
logical divisions on the economic and sociocultural dimensions? 
3. Case selection, data and methods 
3.1. The case of Finland 
Analyzing the case of Finland is useful for better understanding AP in 
multiparty settings and the relationship between affective and ideolog-
ical polarization. Finland’s party system is characterized by the exis-
tence of multiple governmental parties and wide coalition governments. 
During the four parliamentary periods analyzed here (2007–2019), the 
number of parliamentary parties has varied between eight and 11. 
Government coalitions have been extremely wide, with the current 
Marin government including five parties, the previous Sipilä govern-
ment three, the Katainen government six and the Vanhanen government 
four. Unlike in the two-party system of the United States, where the 
concept of AP was coined, in a multiparty setting citizens are not given 
the possibility to simply identify with one party and distance themselves 
from the other. Studying AP in the Finnish context, thus, helps in un-
derstanding how the phenomenon of AP differs between two party and 
multiparty systems. In particular, our analysis of affective blocs is useful 
for understanding dynamics of AP across party lines and how these 
dynamics may affect the formation of government coalitions. 
Finland is also a country of relatively low ideological polarization 
(Dalton 2008; Reiljan 2020). Thus, to the extent that affective and 
ideological polarization are linked, Finland is a least likely case for AP to 
occur. But as noted above, the existing evidence on the link between 
affective and ideological polarization is mixed, some scholars claiming 
the link is relatively strong and others arguing that ideological and af-
fective polarization can occur relatively independently from one another 
(e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012). Finding strong and increasing AP in Finland 
would constitute additional evidence for the latter argument. 
The biggest change in the Finnish party system during our analysis 
period (2007–2019) is the rise of the populist Finns Party. It was a minor 
player in 2007, grew to become the largest opposition party in 2011, and 
joined the government in 2015. Splitting shortly afterwards, it again 
became the second-largest party in the 2019 elections and the largest 
opposition party afterwards. At the same time, the traditional ‘big three’ 
Finnish parties—the Social Democrats, the Centre Party, and the Na-
tional Coalition Party—have suffered at the voting booths. This change 
in the party system is a likely driver of AP between supporters of 
different parties or possibly even an indicator of the wider polarization 
of society. 
Finally, Huddy et al. (2018) found that in Sweden, partisans with an 
ideological stance consistent with that of their preferred party show 
more favorability toward parties within the same coalition (Huddy et al., 
2018). It is important to note that the process for forming government 
coalitions is very different in Sweden and Finland and thus, our analysis 
of affective blocs is markedly different from Huddy et al.‘s approach. In 
Sweden, parties have traditionally been (until the latest election) 
grouped into two blocs which have been expected to form a government 
together if their coalition gets enough votes, which has made it sensible 
to study polarization between these blocs. Finland, meanwhile, has been 
characterised by shifting government coalitions which have often 
included parties from opposing ends of the political spectrum. In the 
Finnish context we would, nonetheless, expect partisans to display 
favoritism toward not just their own party, but the parties associated 
with similar views and identities. 
3.2. Data 
We used data from the Finnish National Election Survey (FNES), 
which, since 2003, has contained the Finnish part of the CSES.1 We used 
data from 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019, each survey having been 
collected shortly after the respective year’s parliamentary election. The 
FNES data extend back to 2003, but because of differences in the 
wordings of several relevant questions, we only focus on the surveys 
conducted since 2007. 
In measuring AP and partisan affect, we draw from Iyengar et al. 
(2012) and Reiljan (2020). We used responses to the questions “Do you 
usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?” and “Do you 
feel you are a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?” 
and categorized those who answered “Yes” to either one as partisans. 
Then, we used responses to the question “Which party?” to assign each 
respondent to an in-party. We only included respondents for whom we 
could name a parliamentary party as the in-party. We refer to re-
spondents who reported feeling close (st) to a party as partisans or 
supporters of that party. Each respondent had been asked to rate the 
parliamentary parties on a scale of 0–10 with the following question: 
“What do you think about the following (political) parties on a scale of 
0–10, where 0 means ‘strongly dislike’ and 10 means ‘strongly like’ 
[Party]?” We only included respondents who gave a score to all of the 
parties that were named.2 
3.3. Measuring AP 
We used the Affective Polarization Index (Reiljan 2020) for measuring 
polarization. The API is computed by first grouping respondents by party 
affiliation and then taking the average rating of each partisan group for 
each of the parties. This yields an N x N matrix of average ratings, with N 
1 All data employed in the current study can be obtained via the website of 
the Finnish National Election Study Consortium: https://www.vaalitutkimus. 
fi/en/. Likewise, all Python and R code used in the analysis is available on 
Github at https://github.com/aasitus/affective_blocs.  
2 Blue Reform was a parliamentary party from 2017, but lost all of its seats in 
the 2019 election. We did not use the party thermometer ratings for this party 
and discarded its participants. Movement Now gained a seat in 2019, but the 
survey did not include a thermometer question about it, and we similarly dis-
carded its partisans. 
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being the number of parties in parliament. Each group’s AP score is then 
computed by taking the weighted average of the differences in ratings 
given to the in-party and each out-party. Formally, the AP score for 









1 − Vote sharen
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whereLikemstands for the average rating given by supporters of party n 
for party m. For the weighting, following Reiljan, we used the vote share 
obtained by each party in the latest parliamentary elections. The weights 
are relative to the total vote share obtained by parties other than P. 
Before weighting, the vote shares were normalized to sum up to one.3 
The final API score could then be obtained by taking the weighted 
average of the N party polarization scores, with each groups’ weight 






This index and each partisan group’s score theoretically ranges from 
− 10 to 10. Negative scores, however, would be unexpected, given that 
such a score indicates that partisans prefer an average out-party more 
than their in-party. We used this index value to compare the polarization 
levels between various years, most importantly between 2015 and 2019. 
To perform a significance test, with bootstrapping, we computed 99% 
confidence intervals for each survey-year’s index value by creating 1000 
resamples of each dataset and computing the API value for each 
resample. 
3.4. Exploring affective blocs 
In a second, exploratory step of analysis, we examined interparty 
rating matrices and the ratings given by each individual respondent to 
investigate the interparty relationships more closely and to better un-
derstand how AP occurs in a multiparty context. Finally, we used a latent 
profile analysis (LPA) on the respondents’ party ratings to explore 
whether voters tend to cluster into blocs that hold several parties in 
relatively high regard, which would indicate that AP in a multiparty 
system is not limited to relationships between single parties. 
Given a set of observed multivariate variables, LPA can be used to 
identify a latent categorical variable, a cluster membership, that un-
derlies the data. The observed multivariate distribution—in our case, the 
distribution of party ratings—is assumed to consist of a mixture of 
multiple multivariate normal distributions, or profiles, with each cluster 
having its own profile. LPA attempts to find these profiles and then give 
each respondent a probability of belonging to each cluster. In practice, 
observations are usually assigned membership in a cluster to which they 
have the highest probability of belonging. Thus, a respondent’s mem-
bership in a cluster is assumed to explain their values of the observed 
variables by describing the distribution from which they were sampled. 
Pastor et al. (2006) present a concise description of the method, which is 
also known as latent class analysis, especially when used with categor-
ical manifest variables (Collins and Lanza 2010), latent class cluster 
analysis (Vermunt and Magidson, 2002), and finite mixture modeling 
(McLachlan and Peel, 2000). 
In our case, we aimed to find a small (relative to the total number of 
parties) number of clusters within which the respondents would rate the 
parties similarly; then, we examined the prevalence of membership in 
each of these clusters in different parties. There are two ways to inves-
tigate cluster prevalence in groups: by fitting a model and investigating 
group (in our case, party) differences or by including group membership 
as a covariate in a latent class regression model (Collins and Lanza 
2010). In both cases, measurement invariance is ordinarily assumed: 
that is, party ratings should not differ between the supporters of 
different parties. This requirement is, however, stricter when using 
group membership as a covariate. Since assuming complete measure-
ment invariance did not make sense in our case—it cannot be assumed 
that partisans of different parties give ratings with all the same proba-
bilities—we opted for the former approach.4 Not assuming measurement 
invariance means that additional caution should be taken when inter-
preting the model. Most importantly, membership in a certain class does 
not necessarily have the same interpretation for respondents belonging 
to different partisan groups (Collins and Lanza 2010). 
We used the tidyLPA package for R to perform the analysis (Rosen-
berg et al., 2018), which uses the Mclust R package to fit models 
(Scrucca et al., 2016). Before fitting a model, the number of clusters 
needs to be decided. Furthermore, tidyLPA allows for fitting four 
different kinds of models when using Mclust, which correspond to 
different assumptions about the variances and covariances of the latent 
distributions. In model 1, the underlying distributions are assumed to 
have the same shape across clusters but with zero covariances. Con-
straining the covariances to zero means that once a person’s cluster 
membership is known, their rating for party A no longer gives any in-
formation about their rating for party B. Model 2 allows variances to 
vary, meaning that the members of one cluster can have a wider or 
narrower range of attitudes toward a party than the members of another 
cluster. Model 3 allows, instead, for covariances to differ from zero but 
constrains them to be equal across clusters. Finally, model 6 allows both 
to vary freely. Thus, relaxing the assumptions allows for better-fitting 
but less parsimonious models. 
Conducting an LPA is often an iterative process in which a variety of 
models are fitted and some are retained for the analysis based on a va-
riety of factors, such as goodness-of-fit indices, interpretability of the 
clusters, and theoretical considerations (Ferguson et al., 2019; Marsh 
et al. 2004, 2009). We fitted all four models with the number of clusters 
ranging from 1 to 8 and investigated goodness-of-fit using the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC), which penalizes complex models. In 
choosing which models to focus on, we balanced goodness-of-fit against 
interpretability and parsimony. 
Finally, to explore how membership in affect-based clusters is related 
to ideology, we placed respondents on economic and sociocultural 
ideological dimensions based on responses to questions policy prefer-
ences included in the data. For the sociocultural dimension, we used six 
questions that we interpret as related to the Green-Alternative- 
Libertarian vs. Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist, or GAL-TAN, axis 
of politics (Hooghe et al., 2002). To measure GAL-TAN placement, we 
used the same set of questions that Isotalo et al. (2019) use. For the 
economic left-right axis, we used responses to four questions on eco-
nomic policy preferences. Appendix A gives the full wording of the 
questions. Respondents’ GAL-TAN and left-right placements were then 
compared to their cluster assignments, and the clusters placed visually 
on a two-dimensional ideological map. This gave us an overview of how 
clusters are situated in the ideological space. 
4. Results 
4.1. AP indices 
The results support our first hypothesis: AP increased in Finland 
between 2015 and 2019. API rose from 3.90 in 2015 to 4.45 in 2019, 
3 We included weights to retain comparability with Reiljan’s earlier analysis, 
but also performed the analysis with the unweighted scores. The difference is 
minor. 
4 Note that our theoretical expectation is that each respondent gives a higher 
score to their in-party than to other parties. 
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with bootstrap computations giving 99% confidence intervals of 
3.75–4.02 and 4.32 to 4.59 in 2019. The average for Finland between 
2007 and 2015 was 3.86, meaning that polarization in 2019 was well 
above what had been previously seen. This also corresponds to a 0.5 
point increase over the average of Northwestern European countries, as 
measured by Reiljan (2020), placing Finland on an equal level with, for 
example, the UK in 2015 and higher than the US in 2012, but lower than 
the average countries of Southern or Central Eastern Europe. Fig. 1 
shows the trend of API scores over time. See appendix B for a table of 
exact values. 
Should this increase be seen as substantially significant? Essentially, 
the change corresponds to an average (unweighted) increase in the 
distances between in-party and out-party ratings of around 0.5 on a scale 
of 0–10 or slightly less than 1 if we consider the change from 2007 to 
2019. It is also worth noting that API previously grew from 3.64 to 4.03 
between 2007 and 2011 and decreased again to 3.9 in 2015. The 2011 
and 2015 confidence intervals, however, overlap, and it would seem 
dubious to conclude that the change between those years was substan-
tial. We conclude that AP seems to be on the rise in Finland and is now 
higher than at any point in the past 12 years but still remains on a 
moderate level when looked at from an international perspective. 
Our second hypothesis is also supported: the increase in AP is driven 
more by increasing out-party hostility than by increasing in-party 
favoritism. Fig. 1 also depicts the development of mean in-party rat-
ings, mean out-party ratings, and the mean of the minimum and 
maximum of the out-party ratings,5 along with the mean of all party 
ratings (in- and out-parties included). The mean of the minimum out- 
party ratings and mean out-party ratings have declined over time and 
over the past 4 years as well. In essence, the respondents rated out- 
parties more negatively than before, and they also rated a specific 
party, the one they liked the least, more negatively than before. A slight 
upward turn in maximum out-party ratings can be seen as well, meaning 
that voters increasingly see some party that they did not name as their 
favorite one in a positive light. Here, the confidence intervals overlap, so 
this observation must be treated with caution. The latent class analysis 
we present below sheds further light on this issue. Finally, the mean in- 
party ratings have also slightly increased over time, indicating increased 
in-group favoritism. Together, we interpret these findings to mean that 
AP has increased, primarily driven by out-party affect becoming more 
negative. However, these changes do not appear overly dramatic, and 
the mean out-party ratings are still in line with the average among 
Northwestern European countries, well above the average of Central and 
Eastern European countries, as described by Reiljan (2020). A substan-
tial change is the roughly 35% decrease in minimum out-party affect 
from 1.8 in 2007 to 1.15 in 2019, indicating increasingly strong aversion 
of voters against their least favorite party. 
4.2. Interparty affect 
We begin addressing our research question concerning affective 
blocs (RQ1) by examining affect relations between pairs of parties. Fig. 2 
shows the average ratings given by each partisan group and Fig. 3 
portrays the distance between the in-party and out-party ratings. We 
find that there are some groups that consistently give good ratings to 
each other’s parties. One such pair is formed by the Left Alliance (LA) 
and the Greens. In 2007, LA partisans gave the Greens an average rating 
of 5.2, which rose to 6.8 in 2019, the highest rating they gave to any out- 
party. Greens partisans’ average opinion of LA likewise rose from 5.1 to 
6.7, also their highest rating. The Social Democrats (SDP) are moving 
closer to the Greens and Left. In 2007, Social Democrats gave their 
highest rating to their former coalition partner the Centre Party (CPF), 
yet by 2019, the out-parties most liked by SDP partisans were GL and LA, 
with average ratings of 5.5 and 5.4, respectively. Left Alliance partisans’ 
rating of the SDP also rose from 5.4 in 2007 to 6.6 in 2019. We interpret 
this as evidence that an “affective bloc” has been forming among these 
three parties—a proposition that we discuss in more detail below. A look 
at the heatmap suggests that the Swedish People’s Party (SPP) could be 
considered a tentative member of this bloc. Interestingly, along with the 
Centre Party, these are also the parties that formed the government after 
the 2019 election. 
We do not find evidence of the development of an counterweight to 
the red-green affective bloc on the right. Supporters of the right-wing 
National Coalition Party (NCP) and the Centre Party have given each 
other’s parties above-average ratings throughout the period, but both 
have decreased. Neither is there significant warmth between these 
parties and the right-wing populist Finns Party (FP), as described in 
more detail below. The generally conservative Christian Democrats (CD) 
partisans give somewhat higher ratings to all of the aforementioned 
three parties than to others, but this is not entirely reciprocated—for 
partisans of NCP, both the Swedish People’s Party and the Greens appear 
more likeable than CD. Centre partisans gave the populist right Finns 
Party (FP) a score of 4.8 in 2007, which dropped to 3.7 in 2019. 
Finally, because it has become commonplace in political discourse to 
argue that the rise of populist parties leads to increased polarization, it is 
interesting to take a closer look at the attitudes towards the Finns Party. 
In 2007, these were not much colder than the attitudes toward other 
parties, perhaps because in 2007 the FP was hardly a major political 
player. Attitudes cooled in 2011, when FP became one of the largest 
parties, and for the most became even colder between 2015 and 2019. 
By 2019, FP is, on average, the most disliked party. SDP, Left and Green 
partisans especially displayed animosity towards FP, giving their all- 
time lowest ratings for the party in 2019. Centre and National Coali-
tion supporters also distanced themselves from FP during the whole time 
period, the former also between 2015 and 2019. NCP, however, is the 
only party whose supporters gave FP a slightly higher rating in 2019 
compared to 2015. The group that has most consistently displayed 
antagonism towards the Finns Party are those supporting the Swedish 
People’s Party, who in 2007 gave FP a rating of 2.4 in 2007 and in 2019 
gave them a score of just 0.98. This dislike is partly, but not completely, 
reciprocated by FP partisans. They fairly consistently disliked almost all 
other parties throughout the period. In 2007, the average distance be-
tween the FP supporters’ evaluations of their own party and of others 
was around 3.8; in 2019, it was around 5. Interestingly, in 2019, those 
affiliated with the right-wing or conservative-leaning CD, NCP, and CPF 
gave the Finns Party a higher score than FP supporters gave to these 
parties. However, PS partisans also gave the Swedish People’s Party, the 
Social Democrats, the Left Alliance, and the Greens a higher score than 
the other way around. 
4.3. Affective blocs 
We investigated the clustering of respondents into affective blocs 
using LPA. We focus on the most robust results, regardless of the number 
of clusters or chosen model parameterizations. However, because of the 
exploratory nature of this analysis, we also discuss how results change 
when the number of clusters and model parameterizations are varied, 
hence making our interpretative process as transparent to the reader as 
possible within the limits of the available space. 
Fig. 1C in appendix C shows the BIC values associated with the 
various solutions we fitted to the data. Based on BIC values alone, the 
best solution would be model 2 with 8 clusters. However, in all cases, the 
BIC decreases only marginally when the number of clusters is increased 
above three or four. Since our aim was to find a number of clusters that is 
substantially smaller than the total number of parties, we focused on 
solutions with at most four clusters. We also considered models that 
constrain covariances to zero to better align with our theoretical ex-
pectations, because these allow us to attribute all correlations in party 
5 Consider that each respondent gives a rating to N parties. To calculate this, 
we took the minimum (maximum) of these ratings and then took the average 
across all respondents. 
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ratings to cluster membership, thus making the models more straight-
forward to interpret. 
Permitting variances to vary across clusters makes theoretical sense 
because it would allow a cluster to have a wider or narrower range of 
opinions on a party than other clusters. In practice, despite their better 
statistical fit, model 2 solutions that allow for this variation were less 
interpretable and contained clusters of more varying sizes. Balancing 
goodness-of-fit considerations, interpretability, and model parsimony, 
we focused our analysis primarily on solutions corresponding to model 
specification 1 and present figures and tables related to the four-cluster 
solution. However, our findings are based on a consideration of patterns 
in many solutions, as well as changes that occur when parameterizations 
are modified. Appendix C contains figures and tables related to other 
model 1 and model 2 solutions. 
We find, first, a red-green cluster. This cluster, shown in Fig. 4, is 
associated with a very favorable view of the Left Alliance, the Social 
Democrats, and the Greens. This cluster shows dislike towards the other 
parties, particularly the Finns Party. As shown in Fig. 5, the vast majority 
of LA partisans belong to this cluster, as do a majority of Green and many 
SDP partisans. Respondents with no partisan identity are relatively un-
common in this cluster. This cluster is quite robust to changes in our 
models. A similar cluster appears in all solutions, although increasing 
the number of clusters or loosening parameter restrictions shows that 
the core of this cluster consists of Green and Left partisans, whereas 
supporters of SDP move to other clusters in larger numbers when the 
model assumptions are modified; here, antagonism towards Finns Party 
emerges more strongly as a defining feature of the cluster. 
A second key finding is the existence of a moderate cluster with 
mostly neutral or positive attitudes toward almost all parties. An 
exception is FP, towards which this cluster displays animosity, although 
not nearly as strongly as the red-green bloc. This cluster contains the 
largest share of SDP partisans, as well as respondents who support the 
Swedish People’s Party, although its small size means that the latter 
constitute a small portion of it. Many Greens, Centre, and National 
Coalition supporters are also found in this cluster. However, this cluster 
is particularly popular among non-partisans, who form the largest group 
Fig. 1. Index value and rating trends over time. See Appendix B for corresponding tables.  
Fig. 2. Mean party ratings of each partisan group for the years 2007–2019. Larger values (warmer colours) indicate that a partisan groups opinion of a party 
is favourable. 
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within it. This cluster is also quite robust. A similar cluster makes an 
appearance in almost all the models we experimented with. It is usually 
the biggest one and draws in a combination of CPF, NCP, and SDP 
partisans as well as non-partisans. One interpretation is that this cluster 
consists of respondents without a strong partisan identity and, conse-
quently, small inparty and outparty biases. Belonging to this cluster 
could also be interpreted as being broadly supportive of the traditional 
order of Finnish politics and the traditional big three parties: CPF, NCP, 
and SDP. 
A third cluster is almost the mirror image of the red–green cluster. In 
particular, LA is viewed with hostility by this cluster, which tends to 
have a favorable opinion of NCP and CPF. However, an important dif-
ference between this cluster and the red–green one is that this cluster has 
no clear consensus on the Finns Party. Opinions lean slightly positive, 
but many members also have a very negative view of FP. Smaller in size 
than the red–green cluster, this cluster contains respondents who are 
close to the National Coalition, the Centre Party, the Christian Demo-
crats, and, to some extent, the Finns Party and the Swedish People’s 
Party. Similar to the first cluster, this one also does not include very 
many non-partisans. 
Fig. 3. Differences between the mean inparty ratings and outparty ratings of each partisan group for the years 2007–2019. Larger values (colder colours) indicate 
that a party is viewed negatively compared to the inparty. 
Fig. 4. Distributions of party ratings for each cluster.  
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The smallest, fourth cluster has a negative opinion of almost all 
parties. The only party that is not viewed primarily with disdain is the 
Finns Party, but even for this party the distribution of ratings is mostly 
flat, with a slight unimodal tendency. Similar to the moderate cluster, 
non-partisans are the largest group within this cluster. However, the 
Finns Party heavily dominates among partisan members. Some SDP, CPF 
and NCP partisans also join this cluster. The empirical distribution of FP 
ratings is bimodal, indicating that non-Finns partisans assigned to this 
cluster do not necessarily belong to it because they like the Finns Party. 
In contrast to the first two, the latter two clusters are less robust. In 
the two-cluster solution, many FP, CPF, and NCP partisans are assigned 
to a cluster that is hostile to the red–green parties but is not unified in 
supporting any other set of parties. Freeing the variance constraint in the 
four-cluster solution instead leads to an emergence of a cluster in which 
many FP, SDP, LA and GL supporters are clustered together, apparently 
because of an opposition to NCP and warmer affect towards the tradi-
tional working-class parties. 
To answer our second research question concerning the relationship 
Fig. 5. Cluster prevalence across partisan groups. Each bar indicates the number of respondents assigned to the cluster who feel close to a party.  
Fig. 6. Ideological positions of the clusters. Large symbols mark cluster means.  
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between cluster membership and ideology, we plotted the respondents’ 
left-right positions against their GAL-TAN positions, and investigated 
how clusters appear on this map. As shown in Fig. 6, the clusters occupy 
specific ideological regions, but with significant overlap. Most promi-
nently, the red-green cluster is overwhelmingly left-wing and sociocul-
turally liberal. The moderate cluster has overlap with the red-green 
cluster, but appears close to the center on both dimensions. The third 
and fourth clusters are difficult to distinguish ideologically, as both are 
economically on the right and lean conservative. On average, cluster 
three is slightly more conservative and right-wing than cluster four, but 
the differences, especially on the sociocultural dimension, are small. 
In three-cluster solutions, the moderate cluster appears near the 
center, clearly distinct from the red-green cluster and overlapping more 
with the right-conservative cluster. While distinguishing between the 
moderate cluster and the third cluster is more difficult, the main dif-
ferences seem to be sociocultural. Further decreasing the number of 
clusters yields a situation in which the split occurs along the diagonal, 
with socioculturally liberal and economically left-wing respondents in 
one cluster, conservative and right-wing respondents in the other, and 
significant overlap in the middle. 
Thus, our analysis clearly demonstrates the existence of a red-green 
affective bloc in the Finnish population, corresponding mainly to the red- 
green cluster identifiable in all models. This bloc is ideologically uni-
form, with a socioculturally liberal and economically left-of-center 
worldview. The situation is not symmetric, and this bloc has no clear 
counterweight. If only three blocs were to be used to characterize the 
Finnish voters, the other end of the diagonal would be occupied by what 
we might call an antiliberal bloc, joining together socially conservative 
and economically right-wing people who particularly dislike the red- 
green parties. However, it seems more appropriate to see this as two 
different blocs instead. A bourgeois bloc views the Centre Party and Na-
tional Coalition favourably and has a related partisan identity. The other 
bloc is hostile towards all parties, except the Finns, and mainly consists 
of Finns partisans and non-partisans. Finally, the evidence points at the 
existence of a large moderate bloc, which does not display strong partisan 
affect, is largely non-partisan, is broadly supportive of Finland’s tradi-
tional political order, and has a centrist political outlook. When it comes 
to the relationship between partisan affect and ideology, we find that the 
red-greens are well separated from the conservative and right-leaning 
blocs ideologically. Neither the economic left-right nor the sociocul-
tural GAL-TAN dimensions explain the animosity that exists between the 
traditional bourgeois parties and the populist Finns Party, but the three- 
cluster solution hints that the sociocultural dimension is more 
important. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Previous research has shown that affective polarization is observable 
in American (Iyengar and Westwood 2015) and European political 
systems (Reiljan 2020; Gidron et al., 2019), but knowledge concerning 
its nature and causes—particularly in multiparty systems—remains 
limited. In the current paper, we set out to examine the dynamics of AP 
in Finland, a case where the political system has, in international com-
parison, long been characterized by low levels of polarization. One 
reason for this low polarization is that government coalitions often 
consist of many parties from left to right. This reduces interparty conflict 
because parties need to work together to achieve their goals. Historically 
speaking, the long period of consensualism in Finland since the 1950’s 
has been attributed to the need to stand united to face Soviet/Russian 
pressures (Alapuro 1999; Ylä-Anttila 2010: 101–102), which has led 
Arter (2015) to characterize Finnish consensualism as “compulsory 
consensus”. 
We find that even in this consensual context, AP has increased and 
that this increase has accelerated over the past four years, in line with 
our first hypothesis. This increase is rather substantial, placing Finland 
in 2019 above the average of the countries of Northwestern Europe—but 
still below the average in other parts of Europe (Reiljan 2020). The in-
crease in AP may partly be attributed to general polarizing de-
velopments around the world during this time period, such as Brexit, the 
Trump presidency and the European migrant crisis. Many have also 
argued that the development of social media drives polarization (Tucker 
et al., 2018). But our analysis shows that the immediate reasons for the 
increase in AP in Finland are rise and increasing anti-globalism of the 
right populist Finns Party and the corresponding strengthening of what 
we call the red-green affective bloc. 
As predicted by our second hypothesis, this increase in AP is mainly 
driven by increased out-party hostility, even though in-party favoritism 
has also increased slightly. This finding and our further analysis of the 
reasons behind it shed light on the role of the right-populist parties that 
have grown significantly in most European multiparty democracies in 
creating AP. Our findings suggest that that increasing AP in Finland is 
driven by the Finns Party, and this is more related to the fact that they 
are viewed in an increasingly negative light by others than to them 
displaying hostility. Attitudes toward the Finns grew colder between 
2015 and 2019, especially among red–green parties but also among 
parties on the right. Thus, although our LPA tends to place Finns sup-
porters closer to the National Coalition and Centre Parties, by and large, 
this is not because their supporters would see each other as friends; 
instead, it is because they share enemies (in the Greens and Left Alliance 
in particular). In line with this result, there was great reluctance among 
other parties to enter a coalition with the Finns after the 2019 election, 
whereas the Finns were open to cooperation with most of the other 
parties if policy could be agreed on. That supporters of right-populist 
parties display less hostility toward other parties than vice versa has 
also been observed in other countries (Reiljan 2020). This disparity has 
also been noted by Westinen et al. (2020), who attribute the strong 
anti-FP stances of other parties’ supporters, in particular those of the 
Greens, Left Alliance and SPP, to major ideological differences between 
these parties – but this does not really explain why hostility is 
asymmetrical. 
One clear explanation for the increase in hostility towards the Finns 
Party from 2015 to 2019 is that the party split in 2017. The moderate 
wing of the party left, and under the new leader Jussi Halla-Aho, who is 
a controversial figure convicted of hate speech towards immigrants, the 
party became more strongly associated with views on ethnic and reli-
gious minorities that are likely to be considered immoral by many op-
ponents. These developments have likely increased hostility towards the 
Finns Party, but not necessarily Finns Party supporters’ hostility towards 
other parties. Another possible explanation for the asymmetry in the 
dislike between the Left, Greens and the SPP on one side and the Finns 
on the other is that populist challenger parties tend to position them-
selves against “political elites”, supposedly consisting of all other, more 
established parties (Mudde 2004). This positioning is reflected in the 
Finns Party supporters in our data being critical of all other parties, 
rating them an average of 3.3, while the Greens, Left and SPP rate all 
other parties relatively high (an average of 4.3, 3.7 and 4.3, respec-
tively), but just one, the Finns, very low (1.7, 1.6 and 1). Thus there is 
much negativity towards others among the Finns supporters but it is 
more equally divided among other parties, whereas the negativity of the 
Greens, Left and SPP is strongly focused on the Finns, creating the 
asymmetry we observe. 
To understand AP in a multiparty setting, we suggested that it is 
useful to go beyond observing the changes of single aggregate metrics 
such as the API and to use LPA to find what we term affective 
blocs—groups of voters that display warm affect toward several parties 
and/or disdain toward another set of parties. Using this approach to 
answer our open research question 1, we found people to be separated 
into affective blocs. We found a strong red–green bloc, consisting of 
supporters of the Greens, the Left Alliance, and the Social Democrats, 
who, in general, have a similar outlook on which parties are good and 
which are bad. We also found a moderate bloc, consisting of supporters of 
traditional relatively centrist parties, who view the parties at the 
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extremes of the political spectrum with suspicion. In addition, parts of 
the supporter bases of the National Coalition Party, Centre Party, 
Christian Democrats, and Finns Party appear to form what we have 
called the bourgeois bloc, with a favorable view of the NCP and Centre 
Party and a negative opinion of the red–green parties. Finally, the Finns 
Party is mostly separated into its own dissatisfied bloc, which tends to 
view all parties with some hostility. Because the clusters corresponding 
to the latter two blocs are smaller, less unified, and less robust in our 
analysis, we could alternatively interpret that alongside the left–green 
and moderate blocs, there is an antiliberal bloc that is drawn together 
primarily by their hostility toward the Left Alliance, the Greens, and the 
Swedish People’s Party but not agreeing on which parties to support. 
These findings suggest that operationalizations of AP used in earlier 
research that equate the in-group of each voter with just one party and 
its supporters may not fully capture the dynamics of AP in multiparty 
systems. 
Previous studies (Iyengar et al., 2012; Reiljan 2020) suggest that 
ideology only partially explains AP. The findings that respond to our 
research question 2 support this view. Ideological outlook and partisan 
affect go hand-in-hand for some parties and blocs. The Left Alliance and 
the National Coalition sit at the opposing ends of the economic left-right 
axis, and we find a large affective distance between these parties. On the 
sociocultural GAL-TAN axis, the Christian Democrats and the Finns 
Party at the conservative end are distant from the Greens, the Left, and 
the Swedish People’s Party at the liberal end, and the status of the 
Swedish language also pits the Finns Party against the Swedish People’s 
Party (Westinen 2016; Westinen et al., 2016; Grönlund and Westinen 
2012). These differences also match the patterns of affect we observe. 
This bloc analysis is useful for understanding the sources of 
increasing AP in Finland. The rise of the Finns party has been com-
mensurated by the strengthening of the red-green bloc. The Left Alli-
ance, Social Democrats and Greens are united in affective terms by both 
their dislike of the Finns Party and their increasingly warm affect to-
wards one another. In addition to being united by a common opponent 
in the Finns Party, the Left, SDP and Greens were in opposition together 
against the right-wing government formed by the Centre, the NCP and 
the Finns from 2015 to 2019, which also likely contributed to increasing 
their mutual affection. 
Our analysis also found the Centre Party, National Coalition and 
Finns Party to be united by who they dislike but not who they like, yet 
we found no clear matching ideological differences. Deeper down, these 
parties’ bases have sociostructural and ideological differences that are 
not reflected in our analysis. In the latest election, NCP and FP were 
more popular than CPF among younger voters, CPF got most of its votes 
from rural areas, and NCP’s voters are more likely to be urban and 
highly educated (Suuronen et al., 2020). Ideologically, FP voters differ 
from the other two groups by being much more critical of immigration, 
bilingualism and prioritizing environmental values over the economy, 
and from National Coalition voters by being more conservative (Suur-
onen et al., 2020). The Finns Party base is also much more critical of 
political elites than that of any other party (Suuronen et al., 2020). In 
Sweden, this critical stance towards elites has been identified as an 
important predictor of attitudes between the right-populist Sweden 
Democrats and the center-right Alliance bloc (Ryan and Reiljan 2021). A 
comprehensive examination of party attitudes and affective polarization 
should consider relevant sociostructural cleavages as well as a nuanced 
picture of ideological divisions. A reasonable conjecture is that the blocs 
we find are connected to social and political identities that are larger 
than identification with single parties. Partisanship is often ‘bounded’, 
in that people in certain social contexts choose between supporting their 
socially closest party or not supporting it, but are unlikely to support 
another party (Zuckerman and Kroh 2006; Neundorf et al., 2011). Thus, 
the examination of these broader identities and their contribution to 
affective polarization is a potential avenue for future research. 
Following the development of the kinds of affective blocs we 
discovered can potentially be useful for assessing the likelihood of the 
capability of certain parties forming functional government coalitions in 
multiparty systems. The government coalition which formed after the 
2019 election consists of the parties supported by the members of the 
red–green bloc (the Left Alliance, Social Democrats, and Greens), as well 
as two parties (the Centre Party and the Swedish People’s Party) that 
they find tolerable. Our heatmap analysis of affect relations between 
pairs of parties over time showed that relationships between these 
parties had grown warmer in the years preceding the formation of the 
government coalition. Towards the right and conservative ends of the 
ideological spectrums, we observed a contrasting development: sup-
porters of the National Coalition and Centre like each other’s parties, as 
well as the Finns Party less than in 2007. If partisan affect is a deter-
minant of which parties can form coalitions, our analysis also reveals 
other pairs and groups of parties for which cooperation would likely be 
possible (such as the National Coalition and Centre Party) and others 
that could hardly cooperate in government under any circumstances, 
such as the Finns Party at one end and the Greens and Left Alliance at the 
other. 
Of particular interest, especially if the trend toward more clear-cut 
affective blocs we discovered continues, is whether voters’ separation 
into these blocs aligns with the respective parties’ political goals. In 
forming coalitions, parties need to agree on policy positions, but their 
ability to form working coalitions might be hampered if voters like or 
dislike potential coalition partners for reasons unrelated to policy or, 
perhaps, for ostensibly ideological reasons that are nevertheless not 
necessarily based on a consistent set of political attitudes (Mason 2018). 
That there appears to be more enmity among supporters of conservative 
and right-wing parties than on the left is interesting in this sense. 
One limitation of the current study is that our measure of AP is based 
on assigning each respondent only one party that they are assumed to 
consider as their in-group. Although this is the best we can do with the 
available data, this is a crude simplification, and in reality, in-group and 
out-group affect would be better captured by data that allowed in- 
groups to consist of more than one party. We get around this with our 
cluster analysis, which shows that respondents indeed form blocs within 
which positive and negative affect are somewhat consistently directed at 
certain parties. However, the relationship these blocs have with partisan 
or other social identities merits further study. Measures have been 
developed to capture notions of expressive partisanship, with questions 
designed to implicitly measure how people think and feel about parties 
(Bankert et al., 2015; Greene 1999, 2004; Huddy et al., 2018). Such 
conceptions of partisanship could perhaps be adapted to operationalize 
more multifaceted in-group and out-group divisions. Indeed, Garry 
(2007) presents a two-question measure that allows for multiple party 
identification. 
A smaller limitation is that our analysis did not take survey weights 
into account. Following Reiljan (2020), we computed the API using 
unweighted data and by limiting the analysis to partisans. Not using 
survey weights could slightly affect the results, but the API itself uses 
party vote shares as weights, which should mostly solve this issue. We 
also performed the LPA without weights, because tidyLPA, the package 
we used, does not support using them. Consequently, the importance of 
certain parties in determining the affective blocs we found could be 
slightly over- or underestimated. Most importantly, voters of the Greens 
and Left Alliance are overrepresented in the data, whereas National 
Coalition voters are underrepresented. This may have the effect of 
making the first bloc appear slightly larger and more uniform than it 
should, but the imbalances of the data are small enough for us to expect 
that the main patterns would remain the same if the data were perfectly 
balanced. Furthermore, because of a degree of measurement non-
invariance in our data, we cannot straightforwardly assume that all the 
respondents belong in a group for the same reasons. We explored the 
effects of measurement invariance violations by looking at how the 
distributions or party ratings differed within clusters when the re-
spondents were grouped by party affiliation. Although partisans tend to 
rate their own party higher than do others, the ratings of other parties 
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are more uniform. Finally, when asked to rate parties, people tend to 
think of party elites, and opinions of supporters are less negative 
(Druckman and Levendusky 2019; Knudsen 2020). 
Apart from addressing some of the limitations addressed above, for 
example by improving the measurement of in-group affiliation, future 
research could further analyze the kind of affective blocs we discovered. 
One avenue would be to analyze the extent to which affective blocs exist 
in other multiparty systems and whether they seem to become more 
salient over time, as we have found in Finland. The findings of such 
research could improve the understanding of how affective blocs are 
related to ideological and social cleavages and what this tells us about 
the nature of AP. We found that affective divisions take place between 
ideologically adjacent parties, especially among conservatives and 
rightists. This suggests that more fine-grained ideological divisions or, 
perhaps more importantly, other social cleavages and social identities 
play a role in party affect. Especially given that much of the research on 
affective polarization has so far concerned two-party systems where 
economic and sociocultural dimensions and many identities align along 
party lines, studying these relationships would be vital. This, in turn, 
would help in understanding the conditions under which attempts at 
cross-party collaboration for the common good would fail, as well as 
those opposing conditions under which collaboration across party lines 
is successful. 
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Grönlund, K., Westinen, J., 2012. Puoluevalinta. In: Borg, S. (Ed.), Muutosvaalit 2011. 
Oikusministeriö, Helsinki.  
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